Criminal Law: Pretrial Identification: An Attempt to Articulate Constitutional Criteria by Eisenberg, Howard B. & Feustal, Bruce G.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 58
Issue 4 1975 (Number 4) Article 2
Criminal Law: Pretrial Identification: An Attempt
to Articulate Constitutional Criteria
Howard B. Eisenberg
Bruce G. Feustal
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Howard B. Eisenberg and Bruce G. Feustal, Criminal Law: Pretrial Identification: An Attempt to Articulate Constitutional Criteria, 58
Marq. L. Rev. 659 (1975).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol58/iss4/2
PRETRIAL IDENTIFICATION: AN ATTEMPT
TO ARTICULATE CONSTITUTIONAL
CRITERIA
HOWARD B. EISENBERG* and BRUCE G. FEUSTEL**
Few pieces of evidence are as meaningful to the average jury
as is the identification of the criminal defendant by a witness to
the crime. No matter how strong the circumstantial evidence, the
statement by the witness that "he is the man" is quite often the
most significant evidence to the lay person. Even when a strong
alibi case is presented, or when the circumstantial evidence points
to the innocence of the accused, the identification of the defendant
by a witness to the crime is sufficient evidence to convict. For this
reason prosecutors and police are eager to present the jury with
such evidence.
It has also long been recognized, however, that eyewitness iden-
tifications are among the most easily distorted pieces of evidence
to present to a jury.' Such an eyewitness identification is highly
susceptible to manipulation not only inadvertently, by a well-
meaning witness' incomplete or mistaken perception, but also by
suggestive and unfair identification techniques utilized by investi-
gatory and prosecutorial agencies.
The United States Supreme Court attempted to come to grips
with these problems in three cases decided in June, 1967. The rules
and standards expressed in that trilogy were subsequently modified
by more conservative or case-oriented decisions decided by the
court since 1972. The purpose of this article will be to discuss the
interrelationship of the various decisions and to provide some in-
sight into how the Constitution relates to eyewitness identifica-
tions.
* B.A. 1968, Northwestern University; J.D. 1971, University of Wisconsin; State Public
Defender, State of Wisconsin.
** B.A. 1970, J.D. 1974, University of Wisconsin; staff attorney, Legislative Reference
Bureau, State of Wisconsin.
1. See F. FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETTI (1927); P. WALL, EYE-
WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES (1965) [hereinafter cited as WALL]; Murray,
The Criminal Lineup at Home and Abroad, 1966 UTAH L. REV. 610; Comment, Possible
Procedural Safeguards Against Mistaken Identification by Eyewitnesses, 2 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 552 (1955); Note, Pretrial Identification Procedures - Wade to Gilbert to Stovall:
Lower Courts Bobble the Ball, 55 MINN. L. REV. 779 (1971).
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I. RELIABILITY OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION
Judge William Ringel states that the unexpected involvement
of a witness or a victim to a crime plays "havoc" with their percep-
tion and therefore impairs the accuracy with which they describe
the events. 2 The reasons for this are quite normal:
What we see is a function of what we are. The human organism
by nature seeks harmony with its environment. If a perception
upsets the balance, the mind will reshape the perception until it
is more comfortable with it.
The same device for intellectual harmony recurs when a wit-
ness is asked to recall what he had seen or heard. No one is
satisfied with half a perception, and faced with this, the mind
naturally rushes to fill the void with what should have been there.
Of course, each of us has his own notion of what should have
been there, and, accordingly, the gaps will be filled with details
which our own environment suggests.3
The resulting inadequate observations are not made consciously by
a witness to an event. Thus, the well-meaning, even impartial wit-
ness can be in error.
These conclusions have been documented. Patrick Wall in his
book Eye Witness Identification in Criminal Cases cites several
studies. In one "mock crime" experiment, height estimates made
by college women concerning the height of two men who had been
participants in the "crime" varied from four feet to six feet, four
inches for one man, and from four feet, eight inches to seven feet
for the other.4 Another test showed that a group of experienced
policemen varied in estimates of the person before them by fifteen
years, five inches, and twenty pounds.5 The above-mentioned tests
dealt primarily with inadequacy of immediate perception. Psychol-
ogist S. E. Asch showed that pressure and suggestion by other
individuals could cause some people to give obviously false answers
in simple line measurement tests.8
II. THE WADE - GILBERT - STOVALL TRILOGY
On June 12, 1967, the Supreme Court reexamined its position
2. RINGEL, IDENTIFICATION & POLICE LINEUPS 10, 11 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
RINGEL].
3. Id.
4. WALL note 1, supra, at 10.
5. Id. at 10, II.
6. R. BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 670-3 (1965).
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concerning pretrial corporeal (lineup and showup) identification in
the United States v. Wade,7 Gilbert v. California,' and Stovall v.
Denno9 decisions. Justice Brennan, writing the opinion of the
Court in all three cases, recognized the dangers of mistaken identi-
fication and determined that a major factor was, ". . . the degree
of suggestion inherent in the manner in which the prosecution
presents the suspect to witnesses for pretrial identification."", The
guidelines established concerned an accused person's right to coun-
sel and to "due process of law."
A. Right to Counsel
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guar-
antees that: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . to have assistance of counsel for his defense." In
Wade, the Court found that this right to counsel must attach at
all "critical stages" of the criminal proceedings. It was noted that
in the earlier case of Powell v. Alabama," the time between ar-
raignment and trial was crucial:
In sum, the principle of Powell v. Alabama and succeeding cases
requires that we scrutinize any pretrial confrontation of the ac-
cused to determine whether the presence of counsel is necessary
to preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair trial as affected
by his right meaningfully to cross examine the witnesses against
him and to have effective assistance to counsel at the trial itself.12
The Court determined that Wade's post-indictment lineup was
a critical stage of the criminal proceedings in which he was entitled
to counsel. Therefore, both Wade and his attorney should have
been notified of the lineup, and the attorney should have been
present, absent an "intelligent waiver."13
The Court was adamant in its belief that presence of counsel
would be beneficial:
No substantial countervailing policy considerations have been
advanced against the requirement of the presence of coun-
sel. . . .In our view counsel can hardly impede legitimate law
enforcement; on the contrary, for the reasons expressed, law
7. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
8. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
9. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
10. Wade, 388 U.S. at 228.
11. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
12. 388 U.S. at 227.
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enforcement may be assisted by preventing the infiltration of
taint in the prosecution's identification evidence."
The right to counsel at pretrial corporeal identification proceedings
was recognized. The Court did not make explicit whether this right
attached at all lineups; the post-indictment lineup was determined
on the basis of the facts to be a critical stage of the proceedings.
Also, the Court left open the question of whether substitute counsel
could replace the suspect's own attorney. 15
The Wade decision did not specifically decide if the right to
counsel attached at all lineups, i.e., that a corporeal identification
proceeding was, per se, a critical stage of the proceedings. There
was a subsequent division of authority in the lower courts concern-
ing the question.
In 1972, the Supreme Court attempted to resolve the conflict
in Kirby v. Illinois,16 deciding that the right to counsel would
commence only at the point in time when "adversary judicial pro-
ceedings" have been initiated against the accused. 7 Thus, where
defendant Kirby had been identified in a one man showup after his
arrest, but before adversary proceedings had begun, he was not
entitled to the presence of counsel as a matter of right.
The Kirby decision definitely restricts some of the language of
Wade. Wade recognized that one of the primary functions of coun-
sel at lineups was to insure that a fair lineup was held and to make
an accurate description of the lineup to bring into the courtroom. 8
The problems a suspect faces at a lineup of noting what is happen-
ing between the police and the witnesses, being able to make
suggestions, and usually not having the credibility to convince a
fact-finder of her version of the story, seem to be just as great at a
pre-indictment lineup as a post-indictment lineup. Also, it is still
not specifically clear how "adversary judicial proceedings" will be
construed. It would definitely seem to apply to any time after the
arraignment, preliminary hearing, indictment or information. The
Missouri Supreme Court has determined that Kirby requires coun-
sel at lineups following the filing of a complaint. 9
The limitation on the right to counsel imposed in Kirby may
13. Id. at 237; see Cornley v. Cochrane, 369 U.S. 506 (1962).
14. 388 U.S. at 237-8.
15. Id. at 237.
16. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
17. Id. at 688.
18. 388 U.S. at 236-9.
19. Arnold v. State, 484 S.W.2d 248 (Mo. 1972).
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not have had a great impact in practical terms. After Wade police,
departments began expanding their use of photographic displays
and relying less on corporeal identification procedure. 21 Most
courts decided that there was no right to counsel when a photo-
graphic display was shown to a witness.2 1
The Supreme Court upheld this point of view in United States
v. Ash,2 and held that right to counsel did not attach at any stage
of the proceedings as far as photographic displays were concerned:
Since the accused is not present at the time of photo display and
as here, asserts no right to be present, there is no right to be
present, there is no possibility that he might be misled by his lack
of familiarity with the law or overpowered by his professional
adversary.?
In dealing with the Wade arguments about defense counsel's role
in ensuring fairness, the Court said: "[t]he primary safeguard




Aside from the issue of right to counsel, a pretrial identification
procedure must comport with certain due process requirements.
The Supreme Court first analyzed the problem in Stovall:
We turn now to the question whether petitioner although not
entitled to the application of Wade and Gilbert to his case, is
entitled to relief on his claim that in any event the confrontation
conducted in this case was so unnecessarily suggestive and condu-
cive to irreparable mistaken identification that he was denied due
process of law. This is a recognized ground of attack upon a
conviction independent of any right to counsel claim. Palmer v.
Peyton, 359 F. 2d 199 (C.A. 4th Cir. 1966). The practice of
showing suspects singly to persons for the purpose of identifica-
tion, and not as part of a lineup, has been widely condemned.
However, a claimed violation of due process of law in the con-
duct of a confrontation depends on the totality of the circumstan-
ces surrounding it.?
20. Steele, Kirby v. Illinois: Counsel at Lineups, 9 Cram. L. BULL. 49, 53 (1973).
21. Id. at 53-4; see also, United States v. Ballard, 423 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Zeller, 427 F.2d 1305 (3d Cir. 1970); People v. Lawrence, 4 Cal. 3d 273, 481 P.2d
212, 93 Cal. Rptr. 204 (1971).
22. 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
23. Id. at 315.
24. Id. at 320.
25. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301 (1967).
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Thus, a reviewing court should examine the confrontation and
determine whether it was so unnecessarily suggestive and
conducive to irreparable mistaken identification.
Applying this standard to the facts of Stovall, the Court found
that due process of law had not been violated. Theodore Stovall
had been taken to the hospital room of the victim, Mrs. Behrendt.
Stovall was the only black person in the room. The police officers
asked her "if he was the man." She then identified him as being
the man who stabbed her. The Court felt that, looking at the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the confrontation, the
immediate confrontation at the hospital was imperative. They cited
the court of appeals opinion which noted that no one knew how
long Mrs. Behrendt would live and she was the only person in the
world who could exonerate Stovall.26
In the companion cases of Wade and Gilbert, the Court indi-
cated how the due process and right to counsel requirements were
to be applied. Gilbert established a per se exclusionary rule con-
cerning evidence of the pretrial confrontation itself. If the trial
court orders the suppression of lineup evidence or if an appellate
court rules on review that such evidence should have been sup-
pressed, use of the lineup identification by the prosecution in its
case-in-chief requires reversal.2z
Failure to comply with the Wade-Gilbert-Stovall standards of
right to counsel and due process require exclusion of testimony
concerning the confrontation. However, the Court in Wade noted
that an in-court identification could be allowed if the witness was
shown to have a source independent of the tainted identification
procedure. The question was:
. . . [W]hether granting establishment of the primary illegality,
the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come
at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means suffi-
ciently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. 2
Wade also listed several factors to be considered in the "indepen-
dent source" determination:
... [T]he prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal
act, the existence of any discrepancy between any pretrial de-
scription and the defendant's actual description, any identifica-
26. Id.
27. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272-3 (1967).
28. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 241 (1967); see also, Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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tion prior to lineup of another person, the identification prior to
the lineup, failure to identify the defendant on a prior occasion,
and the lapse of time between the alleged act and the lineup
identification.29
The prosecution has the burden of showing an independent source
of identification by "clear and convincing evidence.""
There have been four subsequent occasions for the Supreme
Court to consider the scope of the due process limitations on the
use of testimony and evidence derived from suggestive identifica-
tion procedures. In Simmons v. United States," the petitioner
argued that various witnesses who identified him in court had been
influenced by a suggestive photographic display. It was noted that
photograph identification was an effective law enforcement proce-
dure and the Supreme Court would not prohibit its use:
Instead, we hold that each case must be considered on its own
facts, and that convictions based on eyewitness identification at
trial following a pretrial identification by photograph will be set
aside on that ground only if the photographic identification pro-
cedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. 2
Applying this standard to the facts in Simmons, the claim of peti-
tioner failed. The F.B.I. agents needed to swiftly determine
whether they were "on the right track." Also, the witnesses had
ample opportunity to view the robbers and the photographs were
shown to them on the day after the robbery, while their memories
were fresh.
Foster v. California33 is the only case to date in which the
Supreme Court found that the identification procedures involved
violated due process. There were a series of confrontations in-
volved in this armed robbery case. First, petitioner Foster and two
other men were exhibited in a lineup before the only eyewitness.
Foster was approximately six inches taller than the other partici-
pants and was wearing a leather jacket similar to the one the
witness had mentioned in his description of one of the robbers. No
positive identification resulted, so the witness was shown Mr. Fos-
ter in a one-to-one showup confrontation. There was still no identi-
29. 388 U.S. at 241.
30. Id. at 240.
31. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
32. Id. at 384.
33. 394 U.S. 440 (1969).
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fication. A week or ten days later, the police arranged a second
lineup, where petitioner was the only person who had also appeared
in the first lineup. The eyewitness now claimed that he was certain
Foster was one of the robbers.
The Court felt that this case presented a compelling example
of unfair confrontation procedures:
The suggestive elements in this identification procedure made it
all but inevitable that David [the eyewitness] would identify peti-
tioner whether or not he was in fact "the man." In effect, the
police repeatedly said to the witness, "This is the man"....
This procedure so undermined the reliability of the eyewitness
identification as to violate due process. (emphasis original).34
As the Court was reviewing the admissibility of evidence concern-
ing out of court identification, they did not consider circumstances
such as the opportunity of the witness to view the crime. They also
specifically declined to decide whether the due process violation
was harmless error.3 5
The Court seemed to stress the concept of fairness more than
in previous decisions although the holding was on the basis of the
unreliability of the confrontation procedures. In dissent, Justice
Black expressed his displeasure with the expanded concept of due
process. Basically, he felt that standards of "decency and fairness"
applied by the Court on review were inconsistent with the written
Constitution."
34. Id. at 443.
35. Id. at 444.
36. Id. at 444-53. Justice Black dealt at length with his interpretation of the Constitu-
tion:
Far more fundamental, however, is my objection to the Court's basic holding that
evidence can be ruled constitutionally inadmissible whenever it results from identifi-
cation procedures that the Court considers to be 'unnecessarily suggestive and condu-
cive to irreparable mistaken identification.' One of the proudest achievements of this
country's Founders was that they had eternally guaranteed a trial by jury in criminal
cases, at least until the Constitution they wrote had been amended in the manner
they prescribed. Only last year in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444,
20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968), this Court emphatically decided, over strong dissents, that
this constitutional right by jury in criminal cases is applicable to the States. Of course
it is an incontestable fact in our judicial history that the jury is the sole tribunal to
weigh and determine facts. That means that the jury must, if we keep faith with the
Constitution, be allowed to hear eyewitnesses and decide for itself whether it can
recognize the truth and whether they are telling the truth. It means that the jury must
be allowed to decide for itself whether the darkness of the night, the weakness of a
witness' eyesight, or any other factor impaired the witness' ability to make an accur-
ate identification. To take that power away from the jury is to rob it of the responsi-
bility to perform the precise functions the Founders most wanted it to perform. And
[Vol. 58
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In Coleman v. Alabama37 an in-court identification was chal-
lenged. Petitioners claimed that the conduct of the lineup in ques-
tion was so unduly prejudicial that the witness, Mr. Reynolds,
should not have been allowed to identify them at trial. The Su-
preme Court, on review, determined that the trial court could pro-
perly find that Reynolds' identification was independently based on
his observations at the time of the crime. The testimony from the
record indicated that Reynolds had had a "good look" at his as-
sailants.
The Supreme Court decisions to this point appeared to be fairly
straightforward extensions of the standards espoused in Wade,
Gilbert, and Stovall. The Court in Neil v. Biggers3 1 appears to
have altered their analysis of due process as it relates to confronta-
tion procedures. Petitioner in Neil was identified at a showup con-
ducted almost seven months subsequent to the crime. Before decid-
ing whether this violated due process of law, the Court reviewed
the relevant cases and decided that several guidelines emerged. The
main problem to be avoided was misidentification, not suggestive-
ness:
It is, first of all, apparent that the primary evil to be avoided is
"a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification."
Simmons v. United States, supra, 390 U.S., at 384, 88 S. Ct., at
971. While the phrase was coined as a standard for determining
whether an in-court identification would be admissible in the
wake of a suggestive out-of-court identification, with the deletion
of 'irreparable' it serves equally well as a standard for the admis-
sibility of testimony concerning the out-of-court identification
itself. It is the likelihood of misidentification which violates a
defendant's right to due process, and it is this which was the basis
of the exclusion of evidence in Foster. Suggestive confrontations
are disapproved because they increase the likelihood of misiden-
tification, and unnecessarily suggestive ones are condemned for
the further reason that the increased chance of misidentification
is gratuitous. But as Stovall makes clear, the admission of evi-
dence of a showup without more does not violate due process.39
certainly a Constitution written to preserve this indispensable, unerodible core of our
system for trying criminal cases would not have included, hidden among its provi-
sions, a slumbering sleeper granting the judges license to destroy trial by jury in
whole or in part.
37. 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
38. 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
39. Id. at 212.
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The Court further stated that it was not clear from past cases
that unnecessary suggestiveness alone required exclusion of evi-
dence of the confrontation. They declined to reach the question
because the trial of Biggers had taken place before the Stovall
decision was rendered, and previous to Stovall suggestiveness was
merely a matter to be argued to the jury. The central question,
according to the Court was whether the identification was reliable
even though the showup was suggestive. Looking at the totality of
the circumstances, the factors to be considered were:
• . . [T]he opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the
time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy
of the witness' prior description of the criminal, the level of
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and
the length of time between the crime and the confrontation."
Here, the victim spent up to half an hour with the assailant in
adequate light, gave a description which matched the petitioner,
and had "no doubt" that he was the person who raped her. There-
fore, the Court found that under the totality of the circumstances,
due process had not been violated.
The Neil decision essentially said that the factors relevant to
establishing an independent source for an in-court identification
would also be relevant to determining whether testimony concern-
ing out of court identifications would be admissible. Some courts
and commentators had seen a distinct difference in the due process
question of in-court and out of court identifications. In Stovall the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the confrontation itself
was considered, and external factors such as the witness' opportun-
ity to view the crime were not discussed. Similarly, in Foster, these
factors were not considered.
The lower courts have dealt with numerous claims of due pro-
cess violations in eyewitness identifications since Stovall. A wide
variety of considerations have been noted in the various decisions.
1. Suggestive Pre-lineup Occurrences
Actions by police or witnesses may be so suggestive that they
render the lineup itself meaningless. In United States ex rel. Ste-
venson v. Mancusi,4 1 a victim was asked to come to the police
station and view a suspect. After viewing two men, the victim
identified one as the man who stole her purse. The officer with her
40. Id.
41. 409 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1969).
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then pointed to the other man and said, "No, it was him that took
your money, wasn't it?"42 She then changed her mind. The convic-
tion was reversed because the identification was deemed unreliable.
In Dearinger v. United States,43 defendant contended that the
newspaper publication of his photograph in conjunction with a
story on a robbery unduly prejudiced him. The claim was that the
paper identified him as a suspect and thus fatally tainted any subse-
quent lineup. The Court looked to the totality of the circumstances
and decided the in-court identification should be allowed. The wit-
nesses had been in close proximity to the robbers in the bank for
five minutes and the newspaper photographs were not that clear
anyway.
In pre-lineup procedures, it seems to be crucial whether the
suggestive procedure or occurence focusses undue attention on the
accused. Thus in Rudd v. Florida," the viewing of the accused who
sat beside police officers in the state attorney's office was unduly
suggestive.
2. Lineups
Race. A primary consideration in determining the fairness of
a lineup has been the examination of the way the accused appears
in relation to the other participants. Clearly, it is desirable that the
lineup participants be of the same racial or ethnic background. The
victim in State v. Parker," had been assaulted by three Indians.
The ensuing lineup consisted of three Indian suspects and three
non-Indians, and the victim identified the Indians. The court found
no violation of due process due to the length of time the victim had
been with his assailants and the fact that the lineup was held only
a short time after the crime occurred.
Defendant James Crummie was identified in a six man lineup
in Crummie v. Wainwright." In his subsequent petition of habeas
corpus Crummie contended that he was the only overweight, light-
skinned Negro in the lineup. He felt that this caused him to stand
out from the other lineup participants. The reviewing court noted
that no other man in the lineup looked, "quite like appellant Crum-
mie who is very distinctive in appearance."47 The Court felt the
42. Id. at 802.
43. 468 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir. 1972).
44. 477 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1973).
45. 282 Minn. 343, 164 N.W.2d 633 (1969).
46. 427 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1970).
47. Id. at 137.
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lineup complied with due process since the persons in the lineup
had similar features and the police had not systematically at-
tempted to insure the identification of the accused.
A lineup consisting of two Mexican suspects and two non-
Mexicans was deemed obviously unfair in People v. Castillo.8 In
that lineup, defendant and his brother, who were both about 5'6"
tall and weighed about 120 pounds, were joined by two white po-
licemen who were about 5' 10" tall and weighed over 200 pounds.
An in-court identification was upheld, however, because of the
opportunity of the eyewitness to view the crime.
Racial differences in a lineup are an important factor in the
determination of suggestiveness, but it is not enough alone to re-
quire suppression of a lineup on due process grounds.
Height and Weight. Height and weight were factors considered
by the courts in Crummie and Castillo. The State v. King9 case
examined a lineup where the defendant at 6'5" was the tallest
participant by five inches. The procedure was not unduly sugges-
tive since the witness had an adequate opportunity to observe the
crime.
In People v. Caruso,0 defendant was 6 feet 1 inch tall and
weighed 238 pounds. The other lineup participants were not close
to his size, and no one else had wavy hair or a dark complexion
like the defendant. The California Court of Appeals reversed his
conviction, finding the defendant was, "singularly marked for iden-
tification."51
Height discrepancy in the lineup was one of the various factors
that led the Supreme Court to reverse the conviction in Foster.
However, as with other physical criteria, there seem to be no abso-
lute limits on the differences in the heights and weights of the
participants of a lineup.
Distinctive Marks. A lineup should be conducted so that atten-
tion is not focused on a suspect because of a deformity or a distinc-
tive mark. In general these should be covered or some effort should
be made to have other participants appear to have the same char-
acteristic. An interesting example of a good attempt to negate a
distinguishing factor was noted in People v. Beivelman.12 The sus-
48. 130 II1. App. 2d 387, 264 N.W.2d 516 (1970).
49. 296 Minn. 306, 208 N.W.2d 287 (1973).
50. 68 Cal. 2d 183, 436 P.2d 336, 65 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1968).
51. Id. at 187-8.
52. 70 Cal. 2d 60, 447 P.2d 913, 73 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1968).
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pect had a broken leg and authorities had the other participants
use crutches and wear only a sock on one foot.
Other authorities have been less diligent. A bearded suspect
was placed in a lineup where everyone else was clean shaven in
State v. Desereault.53 The procedure was determined to be unduly
suggestive, but the conviction was upheld. Defendant in State v.
Cummings,54 was the only person in a lineup who had a scar on
his arm. The court also noted that defendant was nervous at the
time, while the other participants appeared to be jovial and re-
laxed. The procedure was found not unduly suggestive with the
court stressing that it was impossible to get other people who
closely resembled the defendant and that the police had not con-
trived to deprive the defendant of due process.
Distinctive marks such as scars or tatoos would seem to be an
easy matter for police to deal with in lineup procedures. A long
sleeve shirt could cover the arms and a scar on the face could be
covered with a bandage.
Clothing. A problem often encountered is that the suspect is the
only participant wearing clothing matching the description given
by witnesses. The defendant in State v. Boyd,55 was the only partic-
ipant who was wearing white sneakers, and the witness had men-
tioned sneakers in the description. Also the witness viewed the
defendant through a one-way mirror and thus could not record for
himself possible suggestive proceeures. The court found that they
were unable to discern how long the victim had been able to view
her assailant at the time of the crime, and therefore, the court felt
that a new trial was required.
Number of Participants. There is no magic number of defen-
dants necessary for a lineup. As noted above, one man showups are
often found not to violate due process. Various commentators have
suggested that at least six participants should be in each lineup,56
and Wigmore feels that a one to twelve ratio of suspects to non-
suspects would be fair.57 In England the ratio varies between one
to eight and one to fourteen."
53. 104 Ariz. 380, 453 P.2d 951 (1969).
54. 27 Utah 2d 365, 496 P.2d 709 (1972).
55. 294 A.2d 459 (Me. 1972).
56. N. SOBEL, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION: LEGAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS (1972)
[hereinafter cited as SOBEL]; Note, Pretrial Identification Procedures - Wade to Gilbert to
Stovall: Lower Courts Bobble the Ball, 55 MINN. L. REv. 779 (1971); 20 AM. JUR. PROOF
OF FACTS, Eyewitness Identification at 546.
57. 3 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 786a at 206, (Chadborne rev. 1970).
58. Williams, Identification Parades, 1955 CRIM. L. REV. 525, 533.
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Suggestive Actions by Law Enforcement Authorities. Courts
have allowed lineups where there seemed to be substantial differ-
ences between the suspect and other participants. They have been
somewhat more strict in dealing with procedural problems. The
problem for defendant without counsel is in determining just ex-
actly what happened. In essence, his due process claim must be
established by the eye-witnesses and the police, who stand against
him at trial.
The procedure in Commonwealth v. Lee, 9 violated due pro-
cess. Police there exhibited four men and one woman together to
a robbery victim. At that time he could not identify anyone. The
police then took the victim to a car which he identified as belonging
to the alleged robbers. After telling the victim that the five people
he had seen previously had been picked up by the police when they
had gotten out of the car, the police asked him if he wanted to look
at the group of suspects a second time. His subsequent identifica-
tion was found to have been tainted by the police procedure.
Courts are even more distrubed by possibly suggestive proce-
dure where the witness appears unsure of himself. According to the
Court in State v. Clark,"0 the danger of misidentification is directly
related to the susceptibility of the witness to suggestion. In Clark,
two sisters, eight and ten years old, attempted to identify from a
photographic display, a man who had indecently exposed himself.
Each girl picked the photograph of a different man. At this point,
police suggested that the parents take the girls to a service station
where the defendant worked, so that they could observe and speak
with him. The danger in this procedure was that the police, and not
the witnesses, did the identifying."1
In the previously noted Foster case, the Supreme Court found
the police had shown the defendant in successive lineups to wit-
nesses. Since defendant was the only person who participated in
both lineups, this obviously focused witness attention upon him.
Remarks by the Defendant. According to Wade, having a sus-
pect speak at a lineup does not violate his privilege against self-
incrimination. Defendant in Crume v. Beto62 claimed that having
him say certain words connected with the crime deprived him of
due process of law. The police actually singled out the accused
59. 215 Pa. Super 240, 257 A.2d 326 (1969).
60. 2 Wash. App. 45, 467 P.2d 369 (1970).
61. Id.
62. 383 F.2d 36 (5th Cir. 1967).
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twice in a lineup - once having him put on a hat and later having
him say, "This is a stick-up." The court found the procedure was
not unduly suggestive because it was the witness who requested
that the defendant do these things. Also, the witness felt quite
certain about the identification. Judge Wisdom, writing for the
court, did suggest that the better practice was to have everyone in
the lineup speak the words, noting:
When the witness' "original identification is tentative or is for
some other reason suspect, such a procedure could easily rise to
the dignity of a due process requirement.""3
Witnesses. Witnesses should definitely view a lineup separately.
The court in People v. Blumenshire64 found it improper that the
defendant was identified by several witnesses at the same time.
Showups. The practice of showing just one subject alone to a
witness was condemned in Stovall as being highly suggestive. The
showup confrontation in Stovall was upheld due to the exigencies
of the situation. Lower courts have subsequently taken the position
that if the showup is held shortly after the occurence of the crime,
and is in the due course of prompt police investigation for suspects,
the testimony concerning the showup confrontation will be admis-
sible. Thus a showup was found proper where less than twenty-four
hours had elapsed in United States ex rel. Valentine v. Zelker,5
but a five month delay was improper in United States ex rel.
Harden v. Follette."
Some courts have found themselves in the dilemma of uphold-
ing a conviction based in part on grossly unfair procedure. United
States ex rel. Geralds v. Deegan7 involved a striking example of
suggestive procedure. Twenty days after the crime a single black
man, in the custody of white policemen, was shown to the victims
in each other's presence. Furthermore, the suspect had to put on a
hat and utter the words, "Where's the money?" The reviewing
court found that the spotlight of suggestion could hardly have been
focused with greater intensity than it was here,68 but concluded that
the in-court identification had been founded on an independent
source. The Neil decision seems to uphold this type of determina-
63. Id. at 40.
64. 42 Ill. 2d 508, 250 N.E.2d 152 (1969).
65. 446 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1971).
66. 333 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd, 450 F.2d 879 (2nd Cir. 1971).
67. 292 F. Supp. 968 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
68. Id. at 973.
19751
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
tion and applies it to out of court identifications as well.
Photograph Displays. The Supreme Court applied the Stovall
due process requirements to photographic displays in Simmons.
Factors relating to undue suggestiveness are much the same in
these displays as in lineups. Where none of the photographs shown
in United States v. Fernandez9 even remotely resembled the defen-
dant, the procedure was suggestive. In United States v. Bell,"
however, the court allowed a procedure where Bell was the only
person pictured with a bandage on his forehead and an open mouth
exposing "snaggled teeth." Courts have similarly split in judging
the propriety of showing only one suspect's photograph to a wit-
ness71 or using mug shots.72
The Likelihood of Misidentification. The Supreme Court in
Neil stressed that the reliability of an identification was the key
question in deciding a due process claim. They also indicated that
factors relevant to establishing an independent source of an in-
court identification would be relevant to the determination of the
admissibility of out of court examination.
Various criteria have been mentioned in the previous sections
that courts use in judging whether suggestive procedures actually
have undermined a witness' ability to give a reliable identification.
These criteria were summarized in United States v. O'Connor:3
1. Was the defendant the only individual that could possibly
be identified as the guilty party by the complaining witness, or
were there others near him at the time of the confrontation so
as to negate the assertion that he was shown alone to the witness?
2. Where did the confrontation take place?
3. Were there any compelling reasons for a prompt con-
frontation so as to deprive the police of the opportunity of secur-
ing other similar individuals for the purpose of holding a line-up?
4. Was the witness aware of any observation by another or
other evidence indicating the guilt of the suspect at the time of
the confrontation?
69. 456 F.2d 638 (2nd Cir. 1972).
70. 457 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir. 1972).
71. Held suggestive: Workman v. Caldwell, 338 F. Supp. 893 (N.D. Ohio 1972), affd
in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 471 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1972); Held not
suggestive: Kain v. State, 48 Wis. 2d 212, 179 N.W.2d 777 (1970).
72. Held suggestive: Workman v. Caldwell, 338 F. Supp. 893 (N.D. Ohio 1972); United
States v. Washington, 292 F. Supp. 284 (D.D.C. 1968); Held not suggestive: State v.
Newman, 4 Wash. App. 588, 484 P.2d 473 (1971); McClain v. State, 444 S.W.2d 99 (Ark.
1969).
73. 282 F. Supp. 963 (D.D.C. 1968).
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5. Were any tangible objects related to the offense placed
before the witness that would encourage identification?
6. Was the witness' identification based on only part of the
suspect's total personality?
7. Was the identification a product of mutual reinforcement
of opinion among witnesses simultaneously viewing defendant?
8. Was the emotional state of the witness such as to pre-
clude objective identification?
9. Were any statements made to the witness prior to the
confrontation indicating to him that the police were sure of the
suspect's guilt?
10. Was the witness' observation of the offender so limited
as to render him particularly amenable to suggestion, or was his
observation and recollection of the offender so clear as to insu-
late him from a tendency to identify on a less than positive basis?
Other factors will also be significant in a particular case.74
Harmless Error. In United States v. Counts75 the court found
no error in the failure of the lower court to suppress identification
testimony based on a pretrial showup because an independent
source of identification was shown, and moreover, any error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Few courts have followed the
harmless error approach; most have found that there was simply
no likelihood of misidentification. In Foster, the Supreme Court
specifically refused to consider the harmless error question.
III. ROLE OF COUNSEL
Even assuming that counsel is provided at a pretrial confronta-
tion, it is not at all clear exactly what the role of counsel is. While
Justice White, dissenting in Wade, expressed the fear that defense
counsel would harrass witnesses,76 there is nothing to support that
assertion seven years after Wade. On the other hand, there is noth-
ing to suggest that the presence of counsel has meaningfully made
the identification process more fair.
Perhaps the most important role of counsel at a pretrial con-
frontation is simply to observe the proceedings. The mere presence
of an advocate for the defendant will often have the effect of deter-
ring improper police conduct. Going beyond the passive role of the
observer, however, it also appears likely that counsel should be
able to suggest methods of presentation and procedure that he
74. Id. at 965.
75. 471 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1973).
76. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 258-9 (1967).
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deems to be more fair to his client. The problem is, however, to
whom counsel objects, and what counsel does if his objections are
not sustained. Often a senior police officer will be conducting the
identification, and he will not be inclined in most cases to comply
with the wishes of counsel for the accused. It is also likely that
counsel will attempt to manipulate the lineup to make it overly fair
to his client. That is, he will attempt to arrange the presentation
in such a way so as to have the least likelihood of identification.
Even assuming that there is someone to whom objections can be
made, the next problem becomes preservation of the objection and
preservation of the identification process itself.
It can thus be said that the primary purpose of having an
attorney at a pretrial confrontation is simply to observe and to
make suggestions to the person in charge. While counsel should be
present at the time the witness is identifying the defendant to make
certain that no suggestive technique is used for the identification,
it would be inappropriate for counsel to, in any way, question or
discuss the case with those witnesses. Counsel's relationship should
be entirely with the individuals conducting the lineup and not with
the witnesses. Counsel should also make certain that whatever
objections he has to the lineup are made immediately upon identifi-
cation so that there is no question but that all parties remember
the same facts. In situations in which the objection cannot be
preserved by a photograph, it would be appropriate for counsel to
write down his objections to the procedure and have them counter-
signed by the individual conducting the lineup.
What should counsel do if he believes that the lineup is unfair,
and his subsequent suggestions have been ignored? Consider the
case of Beals v. State.77 A robbery occurred in Madison, Wisconsin
in the late evening of August 7, 1970. Prior to the lineup, an
assistant district attorney had requested that a legal aid attorney
be provided to represent the suspects. An attorney was sent to the
police station. After counsel had talked briefly with the suspects,
a practice lineup was held without the witnesses present. The legal
aid attorney objected to the ratio of suspects to non-suspects in the
lineup, to the disparity of the heights of the participants in the
lineup, and to the fact that the suspects' clothing and hair style
distinguished them from the other participants. When his objec-
tions were not acted upon, the attorney refused to participate fur-
ther and left the police station.
77. 52 Wis. 2d 599, 191 N.W.2d 221 (1971).
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A second and third lineup were held without counsel being
present. The court on review found that defendant's right to coun-
sel had been violated, and that counsel's conduct was improper.
The solution defendant's counsel found in this case was not
proper and in most cases would probably be both harmful to the
defendant and leave counsel open for disciplinary actions. It would
seem, however, that the failure of the police to comply with a good
faith reasonable request by a defense attorney would be an impor-
tant factor in the undue suggestiveness question. The real problem
is that the suggestive lineup may implant a false impression on a
witness who may be able to establish an independent source of
identification.
It seems clear that if counsel for the defendant is going to be
meaningful at a pretrial confrontation, counsel for the State will
also have to be present and some type of relationship will have to
be developed between the prosecutor and the defense attorney.
While an investigatory agency may object to the infusion of more
attorneys into the process, such use would almost certainly result
in better lineup and more valuable identification processes. The
validity of the identification at trial is emphasized, and thus investi-
gatory agencies should not have any objections to giving counsel
for both the defendant and the state more leeway in proposing fair
lineup procedures.
IV. SUMMARY
The problems of eyewitness identification are well documented.
People have been shown to be less than adequate observers. The
problem is increased in times of stress; a witness or a victim of a
crime is normally quite frightened or unnerved by the whole event.
The Supreme Court in the Wade-Gilbert-Stovall trilogy recog-
nized these problems. Both the suspect and law enforcement offi-
cials would benefit from standards that would ensure non-
suggestive identification procedures. To deal with the problem, the
Court enacted a due process test and decided that a suspect would
have a right to counsel if the lineup was a critical stage in the
proceedings.
Not surprisingly, the change in the composition of the United
States Supreme Court resulted in a change in attitude from that
reflected in the Wade-Stovall-Gilbert trilogy. In a series of three
cases, Kirby v. Illinois,7s Neil v. Biggers,79 and United States v.
78. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
79. 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
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Ash,"0 the Supreme Court has upheld criminal convictions as not
being tainted by improper pretrial confrontation. In Kirby the
issue was a pre-indictment lineup, while in Neil the issue was
whether the identification of the defendant by the witness was
independent of an overly suggestive lineup, and in Ash the issue
was whether a defendant is entitled to counsel when the prosecu-
tion displays a set of photographs, including the defendant's to the
witness after the defendant has been indicted for the crime. Each
of these cases were decided over the vigorous dissents of at least
three members of the court. In each case the minority justices
asserted that the mandate of the majority was in violation of the
Wade-Stovall-Gilbert rules. In each decision, the majority mem-
bers of the Court asserted with equal vigor that the decisions were
entirely consistent with the Wade line of cases.
It is submitted that the Kirby-Neil-Ash trilogy can be recon-
ciled with the Wade-Gilbert-Sto vall decisions. The fundamental
change in attitude reflected in the more recent decisions, however,
is not in the general application of the Constitution to pretrial
identification processes, but rather in the conclusions drawn from
the application of the general rules to the facts of the case being
scrutinized. The Burger Court appears to retain the general consti-
tutional propositions espoused in Wade-Gilbert-Sto vall while up-
holding convictions by reason of inapplicability of right to counsel
or no substantial likelihood of misidentification. This is perhaps
consistent with a more conservative attitude towards criminal con-
victions, which applies "fundamental fairness" to appellate review
of convictions, but which does not countenance reversal of a con-
viction because of a denial of a constitutional right which may not
be deemed to be prejudicial to the defendant.
This seems to be a "harmless error" approach of sorts which
the Warren Court specifically avoided in Foster. The earlier War-
ren Court decisions reflect an attitude that general constitutional
restrictions must be placed upon police and prosecutorial activities
to protect the accused against arbitrary action by law enforcement
officials. These earlier decisions can be seen as an attempt to deal
with such abuses prophylactically, while the Burger Court first
reviews the facts in the case and then determines whether the State
action involved was, in fact, prejudicial to the defendant's fair trial.
One difficult aspect of the recent decisions of the United States
80. 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
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Supreme Court is the position that it can review factual determina-
tions.made by lower courts with a view to determining whether the
facts of that case require suppression of the tainted identification.
Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion to Neil, makes clear the
proposition that such review by the United States Supreme Court
is contrary to a substantial body of law. On the other hand, this
gut reaction reversal of lower court determinations did not deter
the liberal majority in Foster v. California, from reversing a state
court determination, again, on the totality of the circumstances.
The Court has rejected mechanical application of the rules in favor
of a case by case review. Their lineup decisions seem similar to the,
"I know it when I see it," determination of obscenity questions.
In his dissent in Foster, Justice Black noted that this substan-
tive due process approach did not have a proper constitutional
basis. In addition these decisions lack guidelines and criteria to be
applied by law enforcement officials and courts throughout the
fifty states.
The Kirby decision is illustrative of the problem. Kirby is
usually cited for the proposition that counsel is not required at a
pre-indictment lineup. That clearly is not the mandate of the case.
At most, the plurality decision written by Justice Stewart supports
the proposition that in most cases such representation is not
needed. The decision held that the right to counsel attached at the
time of initiation of adversary proceedings against an individual,
but did not explicitly state at what time proceedings reach this
point. Applying the standard of "initiation of adversary proceed-
ings" to the facts of Kirby, the Court felt that the right to counsel
had not yet attached at the point of routine police investigation.
It would seem that Kirby can be read to place a premium on
dilatory conduct by the prosecutor in seeking an indictment or in
commencing criminal proceedings. If a prosecutor knows that he
will have to supply counsel in a post-indictment lineup, he is going
to attempt to avoid the purview of that requirement by conducting
pre-indictment lineups even when the evidence he has in his posses-
sion is sufficient to obtain an indictment or file a criminal com-
plaint. In Hayes v. State,8 the Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted
a rule whereby counsel would be required at any time proceedings
actually, as opposed to formally, moved from an investigatory to
an accusatorial stage. Subsequent to Kirby, however, the Wiscon-
81. 46 Wis. 2d 93, 175 N.W.2d 625 (1969).
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sin Supreme Court withdrew that mandate, and now requires coun-
sel only after formal charges have been filed. The Wisconsin court
had previously recognized the distinction between the investigatory
and accusatorial lineup, and had made that the line of demarca-
tion, rather than the formal filing of papers by the district attorney.
The court in State v. Taylor,82 however, abandoned that practical
approach in favor of a strictly formal right to counsel at post-
indictment lineups.
If the case by case approach is going to be used, it should be
accompanied by adequate criteria so that the lower courts will have
some guidance in the application of constitutional standards in
eyewitness confrontation cases. As the situation now stands, the
lower courts have not acted uniformly in their approach to the
question. More importantly the cases have shown that a variety of
very suggestive lineup procedures are being upheld, often under the
justification of totality of the circumstances.
The problem with this approach is that even people who have
had a good opportunity to view a crime may be open to suggestive-
ness. Wall noted in Eyewitness Identification in Criminal Cases
that there were cases where people had even failed to identify their
relatives." The results of the various experiments concerning per-
ception and suggestability show that there is a real need to stop
unfair identification procedures.
If the Supreme Court intends to keep the case by case analysis
of lineup procedures, and ensure that fair and relatively uniform
lineup procedures will exist, they must expand their criteria and
guidelines. The remainder of this article will be devoted to deter-
mining the criteria which must be considered.
V. GUIDELINES
If truly fair lineup procedures are to be achieved, certain guide-
lines must be adopted and followed. The first general concern must
be to determine that a confrontation is free from suggestiveness.
The following guidelines, extracted from the cases and comments
discussed in this article, could be feasibly adopted.
A. Showups
Showups are a highly suggestive form of confrontation and
should only be used in the prompt course of investigation. If a
82. 60 Wis. 2d 506, 210 N.W.2d 873 (1973).
83. WALL, supra note 1, at 13-4.
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suspect is taken into custody within twenty-four hours of the crime,
a one-to-one confrontation may be allowed. In all other circum-
stances, lineup or photograph identification procedures should be
used.
One-to-one confrontations are basically unfair procedures, and
their use should be restricted. The high degree of human sugges-
tiveness must be balanced against the need for prompt law enforce-
ment. In the hours immediately following a crime the police must
determine if they are on the right path. As time passes from the
moment the crime occurs, the witness' memory is more open to
suggestion and the police do not require immediate answers as to
whether a potential suspect is indeed the perpetrator of a crime.
Therefore, after twenty-four hours has elapsed, law enforcement
authorities should use a lineup rather than a showup.8 4
B. Lineups
1. A Prosecutor Should Conduct the Lineup Proceedings
A prosecutor, at the time of the lineup, has had less contact
with the case than the police officers. He or she also will presuma-
bly be more cognizant of the possibility of suggestiveness and the
need to conduct a fair lineups 5
2. No Communication Prior to Lineup
Prior to the lineup, there should be no communication about
the suspects between the witnesses themselves or between any of
the witnesses and the law enforcement authorities. Also, before
viewing the lineup, each witness should write out a description of
the alleged criminal.
Any impropriety before a lineup can undermine the fairness of
the whole process. Any indication that a certain participant is
suspected by them could easily influence a witness. 6
3. Number in Lineup
There should be at least six participants in the lineup. Each
person should have approximately the same age, height, weight,
complexion, hairstyle, and body type.
If a sufficient number of people are participating in a lineup,
84. See Tinio, Admissibility of Evidence of Showup Identification as Affected by Alleg-
edly Suggestive Showup Procedures, 39 A.L.R. 3d 791; see also cases cited notes 65-7 supra;
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293.
85. See, e.g., WALL, supra note 1; RINGEL, supra note 2; SOBEL, supra note 56.
86. Id. See also cases cited notes 41-4 supra.
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the likelihood that a subsequent identification was based on chance
is diminished. The number of people that can be gathered that
match the characteristics of a suspect are limited. A small town in
northern Minnesota may have a real problem in this regard if a
black man is a suspect. It may be necessary to transport the identi-
fication proceedings to a city where participants can be obtained.
Another problem concerns the participants themselves.
Usually, the non-suspects are either policemen or people in jail. In
some cases, volunteers have been used from attorneys and neigh-
borhood youth groups. In any event, participants should closely
resemble the suspect. If the suspect appears to stand out from the
others, then the lineup in essence becomes a showup.87
4. Marks and Clothing
Any distinctive features or markings on a lineup participant
should be covered or camouflaged. Also, all participants should be
wearing similar clothing.
Again, a suspect should not appear to stand out from the other
participants. With a little ingenuity, almost any abnormality can
be blocked from the witness' view or the whole group can be made
to appear similarly afflicted.81
5. Vocal Comments
Participants should not speak during the lineup. If any voice
identification proceedings are requested by a witness, all the partic-
ipants should make the same comment.
It has been noted that voice identifications are not very reliable.
Therefore, statements should not be elicited from lineup partici-
pants as a matter of course. If a witness does make a request to
hear someone's voice all the participants should speak. If only one
person speaks then the confrontation becomes, in essence, a
showup.8 9
6. Witness Identification
Witnesses should view the lineup separately and their identifi-
cations recorded out of each other's presence.
Witnesses can sway each other. The Wall study referred to
87. Note 85 supra; see also Tinio, Admissibility of Evidence of Lineup Identification
as Affected by Allegedly Suggestive Lineup Procedures, 39 A.L.R.3d 487.
88. Note 85 supra; see also cases cited notes 52-4 supra.
89. Note 85 supra; see, e.g., Annot., Requiring Suspect or Defendant to Demonstrate
Voice for Purpose of Identification, 24 A.L.R.3d 1261; see also Crume v. Beto, 383 F.2d
36 (5th Cir. 1967).
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earlier demonstrated how many people can be persuaded to follow
other people's opinions. If various witnesses view the lineup to-
gether, they might try to reach a consensus rather than having each
person decide carefully for himself."
7. Record of Lineup
At least two large color photographs should be taken of the
lineup. If feasible, the entire procedure should be videotaped or
filmed. A written record should also be made.
The procedure should be preserved in order to allow subsequent
scrutinization. It is important that disputes over the fairness of a
lineup do not become solely questions of credibility."
8. Presence of Counsel
If counsel is present, he should be allowed to make suggestions,
and they should be implemented where reasonable. All such re-
quests should be made a part of the written record.
Counsel for a suspect can play a helpful role in the lineup
proceedings. Reasonable suggestions that diminish the likelihood
of identifications by chance benefits all concerned. 2
C. Photograph Identification
Witnesses should view photographs separately. They should
make a written description of the alleged criminal before they view
the display. As with lineup procedures, every possible considera-
tion should be taken to ensure that it is the witness, himself, and
not a police officer or another witness, who is determining who the
alleged criminal was.93
At least ten photographs should be shown to each witness. All
photographs should be of people who have similar age, complex-
ion, hair, and hairstyle. When full length photographs are used, the
height and weight should be similar. The photographs should not
be of different size and mixed batches of black and white and color
photographs should not be used. A photograph like a participant
at a lineup, should not appear to stand out to a witness. Difficulties
may occur when a particular suspect has distinctive characteristics
90. Note 85 supra; see also People v. Blumenshire, 42 Il1. 2d 508, 250 N.E.2d 152
(1969).
91. Note 85 supra; see also Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969).
92. Note 85 supra: see also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218(1967); United States
v. Allen, 408 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
93. See Tinio, Admissibility of Evidence of Photographic Identification as Affected by
Allegedly Suggestive Identification Procedures, 39 A.L.R.3d 1000; SOBEL, supra note 56.
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but the police have many photographs at their disposal.94
A prosecutor should conduct the proceedings and a written
record should be made. As noted in the discussion in the lineup
section, a prosecutor at the point of pretrial identification has had
less contact with the case. He or she also would be more cognizant
of the constitutional requirements of a fair identification proce-
dure.95
If a lineup, showup, or photograph identification is determined
to comply with the above guidelines, testimony concerning the out
of court identification should be admissible at trial. If the proce-
dure is found not to have met the criteria, then it should be deemed
suggestive.
Given the Supreme Court's decision in Neil, a suggestive con-
frontation may be admissible if certain factors indicate that there
is no substantial likelihood of misidentification. These factors
were:
[ . . T]he opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the
time of the crime, the witness degree of attention, the accuracy
of the 'witness' prior description of the criminal, the level of
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and
the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.9"
It is submitted that the above considerations are not enough. Even
where these factors might seem to indicate that an identification
was reliable, a suggestive procedure might have unduly influenced
a witness. One author notes that establishing an independent
source of identification is a difficult task, and suggests that an
identification procedure be instituted.9" That is, when an out of
court procedure is deemed suggestive, then it would be inadmis-
sible unless the witness could make a positive identification in a
proper lineup held before the trial. Testimony concerning this
procedure would not be admissible at trial, but would merely be a
check on their independent source test.
If the above criteria are not generally adopted, it may be up to
legal aid groups, prosecutors, and law enforcement officials to
develop the criteria. Almost all police departments have a standard
procedure developed. In Clark County, Nevada the following regu-
94. Id. See also cases cited notes 69-72 supra.
95. WALL, supra note 1; SOBEL, supra note 56.
96. 409 U.S. 188 at 212.




lations were adopted jointly by the District Attorney and the Pub-
lic Defender's Office:
1. No line-up identification should be held without discus.s-
ing the legal advisability of such line-up with the office of the
District Attorney.
2. No line-up should be held without a member of the Dis-
trict Attorney's office being present.
3. No line-up should be held without a member of the Pub-
lic Defender's office being present.
4. Insofar as possible, all persons in line-up should be of the
same general age, racial and physical characteristics (including
dress).
5. Should any body movement, gesture, or verbal statement
be necessary, this should also be done uniformly and any such
movement, gesture, statement should be done one time only by
each person participating in the line-up and repeated only at the
express request of the person attempting to make identification.
6. The customary line-up photograph should be taken, devel-
oped as soon as possible and a copy of such photograph made
available immediately to the Public Defender's office.
7. If more than one person is called to view a line-up, the
persons should not be allowed, before the completion of all wit-
nesses' attempted identification, to discuss among themselves
any facet of their view of the line-up or the result of their conclu-
sions regarding the same.
8. All witnesses who are to view the line-up should be pre-
vented from seeing the suspect in custody and in particular in
handcuffs, or in any manner that would indicate to the witness
the identity of the suspect in question.
9. All efforts should be made to prevent a witness from
viewing any photographs of the suspect prior to giving the line-
up.
10. All conversation between the police officer and prospec-
tive witnesses should be restricted to only indispensible direction.
In all cases nothing should be said to the witness to suggest
suspect is standing in the particular line-up.
11. Should there be any more than one witness, only one
witness at a time should be present in the room where the line-
up is conducted.
12. There should be a minimum of persons present in the
room where the line-up is conducted, and a suggested group
would be the law enforcement officer conducting the line-up, a
representative of the District Attorney's office, a representative
of the Public Defender's office and an investigator of that office
if requested by the Public Defender.
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13. The line-up report prepared by the law enforcement
agency conducting the line-up should be prepared in sufficient
number of copies to make a copy available, at the line-up, to the
Public Defender.
14. Each witness, as he appears in the room where the line-
up is conducted, should be handed a form, for use in the identifi-
cation. Explanation for the use of the form is self-explanatory
and a sample copy is attached hereto. This form should be signed
by the witness, by a representative of the Public Defender's off-
ice, and by the law enforcement officer conducting the line-up.
15. A copy of this Identification Form should be given to
the Public Defender's officer at the completion of the viewing of
the line-up by each individual witness."
VI. CONCLUSION
The Wade trilogy of cases definitely established the application
of constitutional safeguards to pretrial identification processes.
Subsequent decisions of the United States Supreme Court have
made clear, however, that a factual analysis of each case will be
undertaken to determine, one, whether there has been a constitu-
tional violation, and, two, whether that violation actually tainted
the criminal conviction. Counsel for both the prosecution and the
defense must be mindful, therefore, that the courts will look to
certain definite criteria in evaluating the constitutional validity of
any pretrial identification procedure. The application of certain
definite rules for the conduct of pretrial confrontations will insure
that in most situations the process will be upheld and that any
substantial deviations from such standard procedures will be im-
portant factors in determining whether the identification should be
suppressed.
98. Note, Pretrial Identification Procedures - Wade to Gilbert to Stovall: Lower Courts
Bobble the Ball, 55 MINN. L. REv. 779 (1971).
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